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Abstract
This paper provides an analysis of outsourcing and trade in a spatial model ￿
la Hotelling. In this setting, we discuss the trade-oﬀ between transport cost re-
lated disadvantages and outsourcing-induced production cost advantages of a large
economy. The model gives a rich picture of possible trade and welfare eﬀects of a
movement towards free trade. For example, if there is international outsourcing,
both countries may gain from free trade, independently of who exports the con-
sumption good. However, if specialized input production only occurs in the large
economy and the small country exports the ￿nal good, overall world welfare may
even decline, when moving towards free trade.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Modern industrial production is not an integrated process but characterized by a high
degree of vertical fragmentation and an ever declining scope of activities that are under-
taken in-house. Grossman and Helpman (2002a) emphasize that the decision to produce
in-house or to purchase inputs from outside the ￿rm has shifted in the last decades to-
wards outsourcing of production processes that are not necessarily carried out within the
boundaries of a single ￿rm (Coase, 1937). As a consequence, Grossman and Helpman
(2002b, p. 1) conclude: ￿We live in an age of outsourcing￿.
In the trade literature, both national (Burda and Dluhosch, 2002) and international
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999; Egger and Egger, 2003, Hummels et al., 2001) out-
sourcing have been identi￿ed to play a key role in the recent wave of globalization (Feenstra
and Hanson, 2001; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; and Kohler, 2003). Regarding the de-
cision of a ￿nal goods producer to purchase an input on the local market or to import
it from abroad, there are three main aspects: (i) Cross-country diﬀerences in the factor
endowments, which lead to diﬀerent variable production costs in the manufacture of in-
termediate inputs (Arndt, 1997; Deardorﬀ, 2001); (ii) Diﬀerences in the public provision
of infrastructure, which aﬀect the ￿xed costs for setting up a ￿rm and thus, the location
decisions of input producers (Egger and Falkinger, 2003); (iii) Transport costs and costs
of service links which make international outsourcing less attractive (Jones, 2000).
While the ￿rst two aspects have been rigorously analyzed in traditional trade models
and models of the new trade theory, these types of frameworks neglect the national aspect
when dealing with transport costs as a determinant of outsourcing. The importance of
national transport costs is emphasized by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p. 19) who
remark that ￿[t]he purchase of both foreign and domestic goods need to go through the
local distribution system before reaching the ￿nal user￿, so that the sheer geographical
distance is associated with unavoidable local trade costs. Hence, an adequate discussion
of national transport costs requires a model which allows for a spatial dimension of coun-
tries. Recently some studies have accounted for both the geographical dimension and
2the population size of countries in trade models with spatial competition ￿ la Hotelling
(Shachmurove and Spiegel, 1995; Tharakan, 2001; and Tharakan and Thisse, 2002). Such
models allow to investigate the impact of national transport costs on the pattern and vol-
ume of trade. A factor, that is especially relevant for transactions between neighboring
economies.
The contribution of this paper is to introduce fragmentation and outsourcing into a
linear model ￿ la Hotelling. This allows us to analyze a trade-oﬀ of being large and its
impact on the ￿nal goods trade pattern and the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization in a
world with two asymmetrically sized economies. This trade-oﬀ is driven by the following
two eﬀects. On the one hand, a lager population size leads to a higher degree of vertical
specialization and (under autarky) to more intensive national outsourcing. This is a labor
division eﬀect, which was ￿rst mentioned in Adam Smith￿s ￿Wealth of Nations￿. It implies
lower variable production costs in the case of outsourcing and thus, an advantage of a
large (population rich)e c o n o m y . 1 On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that ￿on
average ￿rms facing larger markets are larger￿ (Kumar et al., 2001, p. 1). Hence, if a
population rich economy is also geographically large2, we can expect (on average) large
geographical distances between producers and consumers of ￿nal output. This gives rise
to a transport-cost related disadvantage of a (geographically) large economy.
To analyze this trade-oﬀ, we procede in the following way. In a ￿rst step, we set
up a partial equilibrium model ￿ la Hotelling with one ￿nal goods producer located at
the center of a linear economy and compare the autarky equilibrium under integrated
production with the autarky equilibrium under (national) outsourcing. In a second step,
the free trade equilibrium between two diﬀerently sized countries is analyzed. This gives
important insights on how the aforementioned trade-oﬀ of being large impacts on the
1A positive correlation between the size of population and the possible division of the labor force is
also mentioned in Marx￿ ￿Das Kapital￿ (German edition of 1980, vol. 1, chapter 12, p. 373): ￿Wie f￿r
die Teilung der Arbeit innerhalb der Manufaktur eine gewisse Anzahl gleichzeitig angewandter Arbeiter
die materielle Voraussetzung bildet, so f￿r die Teilung der Arbeit innerhalb der Gesellschaft die Gr￿￿e
der Bev￿lkerung und ihre Dichtigkeit, ...￿.
2There is indeed a strong positive correlation between geographical area and population sizes of EU15
members as well as of OECD economies.
3pattern of ￿nal goods trade and the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. If produc-
tion is integrated in both economies or if the two countries oﬀer the same (national)
outsourcing opportunities, there is a transport-cost-related size disadvantage of a large
economy, implying that it imports the ￿nal good3 and that its welfare declines, since
pro￿t losses dominate consumer surplus gains. The small country bene￿ts from the tar-
iﬀ reduction since it exports the ￿nal good. This result is in line with earlier ￿ndings
of Tharakan and Thisse (2002) that ￿l a r g ec o u n t r i e s ,u n l i k es m a l lo n e s ,s h o u l db el e s s
inclined towards free trade￿ (p. 399). Things are diﬀerent if a large, population rich
economy has an outsourcing-related production cost advantage over the small trading
partner. In this case, the outsourcing-related production cost advantage may dominate
the transport-cost-related size disadvantage so that the large economy exports the ￿nal
good and, therefore, bene￿ts from trade liberalization. Moreover, our analysis shows that
in the case of outsourcing both countries may (simultaneously) bene￿t from trade lib-
eralization, irrespective of the ￿nal goods trade pattern. This result points to the key
role of outsourcing in the recent wave of globalization with some successful stories of free
trade agreements between rather dissimilar countries regarding their geographical area
and population sizes. (See e.g. EU, NAFTA, etc.)
The paper is organized in the following way. Sections 2 and 3 present the basic
framework of outsourcing in a spatial model ￿ la Hotelling and characterize the autarky
equilibria for the two cases: integrated production and national outsourcing of component
manufacture. Section 4 analyzes trade liberalization between two asymmetrically sized
economies and investigates the price-setting behavior and the ￿nal goods trade pattern
under free trade for diﬀerent scenarios regarding the existence of (local) intermediate input
production in the two economies. The welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization are addressed
in Section 5. Section 6 provides a discussion on the outsourcing-related production cost
advantage of large economies and its impact on the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization.
Moreover, it presents empirical evidence on ￿nal goods trade patterns and outsourcing
3Note that trade is not (necessarily) balanced in a partial equilibrium model, like the one analyzed in
this paper.
4activities of EU economies to appraise the welfare eﬀects of the European integration
process. Section 7 concludes.
2 Basic Model Set up
Consider a linear model ￿ la Hotelling with one ￿nal goods producer located at the center
of a country with length l, i.e. at l/2. In the following, we use the notion ￿country l￿
to refer to a country with length l. The location of the ￿nal goods producer is ￿xed.
Population in country l is uniformly distributed along the line (0,l) with one consumer
l o c a t e da te a c ha d d r e s sb ∈ (0,l).H e n c e , l refers to both the geographical size of the
country and the size of its population, i.e. the number of consumers.4 Each consumer
buys at most one unit of the consumption good. ￿Disutility￿ from a larger distance of
consumers to the ￿nal goods producer is represented by quadratic transportation costs.5
The marginal willingness to pay for the consumption good depends on the location of a
consumer (b)a n di sg i v e nb yA − (b − l/2)
2,w h e r el/2 is the position of the ￿nal goods
producer.
So far the model assumptions are identical to those in Tharakan and Thisse (2002).
The contribution of this study is to allow for two diﬀerent technologies in the production
of ￿nal output. First (and in equivalence with Tharakan and Thisse, 2002), there is
an integrated production mode, where the whole production process takes place in-house.
Second, the ￿nal goods producer may have access to fragmentation and outsourcing, which
means a splitting up of the production process and purchases of intermediate inputs from
an external producer through arm￿s length transactions.
We assume that integrated production (index i) exhibits constant marginal costs ci,
with A>c i > 0. In the case of outsourcing, the down-stream ￿nal goods producer
(index d) uses one unit of a component, purchased from an up-stream intermediate input
4See footnote 2 for a justi￿cation of this assumption.
5The assumption of quadratic transport costs is not important for the autarky situation. However,
this assumption will be crucial for the existence of a Nash-equilibrium in prices under free trade. See the
discussion in footnote 17.
5producer (index u), to manufacture one unit of ￿nal output. The intermediate input
price (net of transport costs) is given by pu. If the input producer does not stay at
l/2, there are quadratic transport costs for shipping the component to the ￿nal goods
producer. Transport costs (per unit of intermediate good) are given by t(l/2 − xu)
2,
where xu ∈ (0,l) is the location of the intermediate input supplier and l/2 the location of
the ￿nal goods producer. Intermediate inputs and ￿nal output are two diﬀerent types of
goods so that the transportation technologies for shipping intermediate and ￿nal goods
may also be diﬀerent. This is re￿ected by t R 1. In the absence of any additional
production costs in the down-stream process, pd
u := pu + t(l/2 − xu)
2 are (transport cost
including) variable production costs of the down-stream ￿nal goods producer in the case
of outsourcing. The technology of (outsourced) intermediate input production exhibits
constant marginal production costs cu.W ea s s u m ecu <c i. In the case of fragmentation
and outsourcing there are gains from splitting up production (i.e. from division of labor), if
ci >c u+t(l/2 − xu)
2. In the following, we use the notion ￿cost advantage of fragmentation
and outsourcing￿ to refer to these gains.6
Outsourcing is only possible if there exists an input producer who supplies the required
fragment. Otherwise, the ￿nal goods producer does not have access to outsourcing and is
therefore tied to the integrated production mode. With respect to the number of active
intermediate input producers we distinguish two cases: one with a single input producer
located at a given address xu ∈ (0,l) and one without an input producer active in country
l.
3 Autarky Equilibrium
If an input producer is active, there is a sequence of four decisions that determines the
autarky equilibrium: (i) The input producer (a monopolist in the intermediate goods
market) sets a price pu vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods producer (a monopolist in the ￿nal goods
6Grossman and Helpman (2002a, pp. 90-91) remark the following: ￿The possibility that production
may be more costly for an integrated ￿rm re￿ects the fact that its activities are not so highly specialized
and that the bureaucratic cost of managing a larger operation may be higher.￿
6market). (ii) Based on that price, the transport costs for intermediate goods transactions
and marginal production costs ci,t h e￿nal goods producer chooses between in-house
supply of the input (integrated production) and purchases from outside the ￿rm (out-
sourcing). (iii) The ￿nal goods producer (￿nishes output and) sets the mill price for the
￿nal good.7 (iv) Consumers make their purchases. Things are diﬀerent if there is no input
producer active in country l. In this case, the sequence of decisions reduces to stages (iii)
and (iv). The autarky equilibrium can be derived through backward induction.
Stage (iv) - Consumption: A consumer located at address b has positive demand
if A>p(b): =p+(b − l/2)
2,w h e r ep is the ￿n a lg o o d ￿ sm i l lp r i c e .H e n c e ,a g g r e g a t e￿nal
g o o d sd e m a n di sg i v e nb y 8
D =

   









p ∈ [0,A− l2/4]
p ∈ ]A − l2/4,A]
p>A
.( 1 )
Stage (iii) - Price setting of the ￿nal goods producer: The ￿nal goods producer
sets the pro￿t-maximizing mill price in view of (1). Pro￿ts under integrated production
and pro￿ts under outsourcing must be distinguished.
First, if the single ￿nal goods producer located at the center of market l produces the











pi ∈ ]A − l2/4,A]
pi ∈ [0,A− l2/4]
, (2)










A<c i +3 l2/4
A ≥ ci +3 l2/4
.( 3 )
7We use the term ￿mill price￿ in the context of ￿nal goods transactions but not in the context of
component purchases since we will allow for (spatial) price discrimination of the intermediate input
producer under free trade. See Tharakan (2001) for a similar use of terms.
8Remember that each consumer buys at most one unit of the consumption good.
9Of course, π(pi)=0if pi >A ,a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) .


















pd ∈ ]A − l2/4,A]
pd ∈ [0,A− l2/4]
, (4)
where pd
u = pu +t(l/2 − xu)
2 is the transport cost including input price paid by the ￿nal
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Hence, if there is a specialized input producer active in country l,t h e￿nal goods producer
opts for outsourcing if ci ≥ pd
u = pu + t(l/2 − xu)
2 and chooses integrated production if
ci <p d
u = pu + t(l/2 − xu)
2.10
From now on, the analysis is restricted to a parameter domain that guarantees full cov-
erage in autarky so that all consumer buy one unit of the consumption good, irrespective
of whether outsourcing or integrated production is chosen by the ￿nal goods producer. A
suﬃcient condition for such a parameter constellation is given by Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 A>c i +3 l2/4.
Consider integrated production ￿rst. A>c i +3 l2/4 implies pi = A − l2/4.( S e e
(3).) Second, note that outsourcing is chosen if and only if pd
u ≤ ci.T h u s ,i nt h ec a s eo f
outsourcing A>c i +3 l2/4 implies A>p d
u +3 l2/4 and, therefore, pd = A − l2/4.( S e e
10In the case of indiﬀerence, the ￿nal goods producer decides for outsourcing.
8(5).) In sum, under Assumption 1, pi = pd = A − l2/4 and D = l,a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) ,( 3 )
and (5).










pu ≤ ci − t(l/2 − xu)
2
pu >c i − t(l/2 − xu)
2 ,( 8 )
according to the analysis of stage (ii) and Assumption 1. If there is a cost advantage
of fragmentation and outsourcing as compared to integrated production, i.e. if cu ≤
ci − t(l/2 − xu)











Before we summarize the ￿ndings for the autarky equilibrium, we introduce a further
assumption with respect to the location of the input producer. If a specialized input
producer is active in country l, its location is xu = l/2, i.e. at the same address as
the ￿nal goods producer.12 In this case, there is always a cost advantage of national
outsourcing, due to cu <c i.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 the following holds in the autarky equilibrium:
(a) If there is a specialized input producer located at xu = l/2,t h e npu = ci and pd =
A−l2/4 are pro￿t-maximizing input and ￿nal goods prices, respectively. Pro￿ts are given
by π∗
u =( ci − cu)l and π∗
d =( A − l2/4 − ci)l.
(b) If there is no specialized input producer, then pi = A−l2/4 and π∗
i =( A − l2/4 − ci)l.
Proof. Proposition 1 follows from the backward induction above.
In the following analysis, we consider two asymmetrically sized economies: a small
one with size s =1and a large one with size L>1. The two economies may diﬀer with
11Note that pu = ci − t(l/2 − xu)
2 implies pd
u = ci.
12It is straightforward that xu = l/2 would be the optimal address, if the input producer could freely
choose a location. This has been shown in an earlier version of this study. However, location choices are
not analyzed in the current version of this paper.
9respect to the existence of an input producer (see Proposition 1). In all other respects
the two countries are identical and Assumption 1 holds for both countries so that there
is full coverage under autarky.
>Figure 1<
Figure 1 illustrates the autarky equilibrium in the two diﬀerently sized economies.
According to Proposition 1, the ￿nal goods producer in country s sets a higher mill price
than its counterpart in country L: pa
s = A − 1/4 >p a
L = A − L2/4,w h e r ea refers
to autarky. Serving the whole market implies higher transport costs and thus, for a
given willingness to pay A, a lower mill price in country L. This result depends only
on Assumption 1 and is independent of which production modes are used in the two
economies.
In the next section we analyze the prices and the trade pattern in the free trade
equilibrium for diﬀerent scenarios regarding the existence of a local input producer in the
two asymmetrically sized economies.
4 Free Trade Equilibrium
To analyze the impact of trade liberalization, we follow the common approach and assume
that tariﬀso n￿nal as well as intermediate goods trade between countries s and L fall
from in￿nity to zero. Free trade means that consumers have the choice to purchase the
￿nal good from either seller (i.e. from the one located at the center of country s or the one
located at the center of country L), but must bear the corresponding quadratic transport
costs. This implies that under free trade some consumers may purchase the ￿nal good
abroad. Hence, there is cross-country competition of ￿nal goods producers instead of
the monopoly under autarky. (This may but does not necessarily result in lower ￿nal
goods prices as has been shown by Tharakan and Thisse, 2002.) In addition, ￿nal goods
producers may purchase the component from abroad if an input producer is active there.
Hence, there may also be competition among input producers under free trade.
10We do not investigate location and entry/exit decisions of ￿nal and intermediate goods
producers. These decisions are exogenously given. With respect to the number of inter-
mediate input producers active in the two economies, the following three cases are dis-
tinguished: (1) There is no specialized input producer active in countries s and L, i.e.
only the integrated production mode is available for the two ￿nal goods producers. (This
corresponds to the analysis of Tharakan and Thisse, 2002.) (2) There is a single input
producer active in the large economy, but no input producer located in country s.( 3 )
There are two input producers, one located in either economy.13
In the following, we investigate the impact of trade liberalization on prices and the
trade pattern for these three cases. Thereby, we proceed in the following way. We start
with an analysis of stages (iv) and (iii) of the stage (i)-(iv) equilibrium (described in
Section 3). Then, we summarize the ￿ndings for case (1) with no intermediate input
production under free trade. Stages (i) and (ii) are separately investigated for cases (2)
and (3) with intermediate input production in one or both economies, respectively.
Stage (iv) - Consumption: For given ￿nal goods prices ps,p L in s and L, respec-




   









pL − ps < −
(L+3)(L+1)
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A − ps, (11)










A − pL. (12)
13Of course, there is a fourth case with a single input producer in country s and no specialized input
producer in country L. However, there are two reasons, why this case is not considered. First, it
has been shown in an earlier version of this study that under the assumption of ￿x e ds e t - u pc o s t sf o r
intermediate goods production, positive autarky pro￿ts of the input producer only arise if the country
has a certain minimum size. Positive pro￿ts are important for the entry decisions of ￿rms, an issue that is
not considered in the current version of this paper. Second, empirical evidence that is reported in Section
6 indicates that the degree of domestic outsourcing is positively related to a country￿s population size.
11Then, for given prices ps,p L,
Ds =[ m i n ( v,xm) − max(0,w)], (13)
DL =[ m i n ( L +1 ,y) − max(z,xm)] (14)
give the demand for ￿nal output produced in country s or country L, respectively.
Stage (iii) - Price setting of the two ￿nal goods producers: When there
are component producers, denote by pk0
u,k the price, net of transport costs, of an input
produced in country k a n ds o l dt ot h e￿nal goods producer in country k0,w h e r ek0,k∈
{s,L}. Moreover, let in the case of outsourcing pk,d
u be the transport cost including input
price paid by the ￿nal goods producer located at the center of country k = s,L.I f
the ￿nal goods producer outsources to the local input producer, then pk,d
u = pk
u,k (given
the location of ￿nal and intermediate goods producers). However, if the ￿nal goods







¢2,w h e r eL+1
2 is the distance between the two producers (see





, k = s,L, to refer to the
two production modes. Thereby, ck = ci holds if the ￿nal goods producer in country k
produces integrated, whereas ck = pk,d
u are marginal production costs of the down-stream
process, if the ￿nal goods producer outsources component production.
According to (13) and (14), free trade pro￿ts of the ￿nal goods producer in s and L
are given by









Tharakan and Thisse (2002) identify (for the case of integrated production in both
economies) four parameter domains, which determine the set of possible price equilibria.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a rigorous analysis of all possible parameter
domains. Therefore, we introduce a further assumption, namely that trade liberalization
12has a pro-competitive eﬀect and leads to full coverage under free trade. A suﬃcient
condition for such an outcome is given by Assumption 2.14
Assumption 2 A>c i + 15L2+12L
12 .
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, for all15 ck ≤ ci, k = s,L, the following holds in a free
trade equilibrium: (i) Demand for ￿nal goods produced at the two locations is given by
Ds = xm (ps,p L) and DL = L +1− xm (ps,p L), respectively. (ii) There is full coverage
in the free trade equilibrium with each consumer buying one unit of ￿nal output, i.e.
Ds + DL = L +1 . (iii) Pro￿ts of the two ￿nal goods producers are given by
πs =( ps − c






(L +1− xm (ps,p L)), (18)
respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To obtain a unique equilibrium in prices, we impose a restriction on the price-setting
behavior of ￿rms, namely pk ≥ ck, k = s,L.16 Then, maximizing pro￿ts (17) and (18)
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   
















cL ≥ cs + γ2
(20)
14Note that Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1 for both countries. Hence, there is full coverage under
autarky if there is full coverage under free trade.
15A ss h o w ni ns t a g e( i i ) ,ck >c i is not consistent with an equilibrium.
16It is shown in the proof of Appendix A that some pk <c k may be consistent with an equilibrium if
there are zero sales of the ￿nal goods producer located in country k. Such price equilibria are ruled out
by the proposed assumption on the price-setting behavior of ￿rms. For a logically similar problem in a
diﬀerent context, see Ludema and Wooton (2000).
13where γ1 :=
(5L+7)(L+1)
4 and γ2 :=
(7L+5)(L+1)
4 .17 Note that p∗
s <p a
s = A − 1/4 and
p∗
L <p a
L = A − L2/4 are a direct consequence of cs ≤ ci, cL ≤ ci and Assumption 2.
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cL ≥ cs + γ2
. (21)
In the following subsection, we use (19)-(21) to derive the free trade equilibrium if no
specialized input producer is active in the two economies.
4.1 Integrated Production in Both Economies
If no input producer is active, the two ￿nal goods producers do not have access to out-
sourcing and are therefore tied to the integrated production mode. Equilibrium prices
and the pattern of ￿nal goods trade are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2, the equilibrium ￿nal goods prices under free trade
are p∗
s,i = ci +
(5L+7)(L+1)
12 and p∗
L,i = ci +
(7L+5)(L+1)
12 . The marginal consumer is located at
x∗
m = 5L+7
12 ,i m p l y i n g￿nal goods exports of country s.
Proof. Substituting ci = cs and ci = cL in (19), (20) and (21) establishes Proposition
2.
For identical mill prices the ￿nal goods producer in country L faces a transport-
cost-induced disadvantage, as compared to its small country￿s counterpart, for serving
consumers located near the common border. In addition, ￿nal goods producers take into
account the following two eﬀects of a price reduction: For a given price of the competitor,
17The existence of a price equilbrium (19), (20) critically depends on the assumption of quadratic
transport costs. In d￿Aspremont et al. (1979) it is shown that under linear transport costs a minimum
distance between the locations of the two ￿nal goods producers is essential for the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in prices. However, as shown in Tharakan (2001) this ￿minimum distance condition￿ is not
satisi￿ed by locations 1/2 and 1+L/2 of the two ￿nal goods producers (and country sizes L>s=
1). Therefore, a price equilibrium under linear transport costs is not consistent with our assumptions
regarding the locations of the two ￿nal goods producers.
14al o w e r￿nal goods price, on the one hand, implies higher ￿nal goods sales as the marginal
consumer moves away (see (10)). But on the other hand, it results in lower revenues for
given output. This negative pro￿te ﬀect is higher for the ￿nal goods supplier in country
L, due to its larger hinterland (given by interval [1 + L/2,1+L]). Hence, the ￿nal goods
producer in the large country optimally chooses a higher price than its competitor in the
small economy. Together with the transport cost disadvantage of country L for serving
consumers located close to the common border this implies that the marginal consumer
is resident of the large country (located at address xm = 5L+7
12 < 1+L
2)a n dt h es m a l l
country exports the ￿nal good. This case is illustrated in ￿gure 2.
>Figure 2<
In the following analysis, we use the term ￿transport-cost-related size disadvantage￿t o
refer to the above mentioned (competitive) disadvantage of the large country, making it
the ￿nal goods importer if production is integrated in both economies. Subsections 4.2 and
4.3 investigate the impact of national and international outsourcing on the price-setting
behavior of ￿rms and the resulting trade pattern.
4.2 Specialized Input Production in the Large Country
If there is a single input producer located at the center of country L, i.e. at address xu =









u,L are the input prices relevant for the ￿nal goods producer located at the
center of country s and its counterpart located at the center of country L, respectively.18
The results of stages (iii) and (iv) are considered in the following analysis of stages (i)
and (ii).
Stage (ii) - Outsourcing decision: The ￿nal goods producer in country k = s,L
decides for outsourcing if pk,d
u ≤ ci. Otherwise, production is integrated.
18The input producer sets discriminative prices if ps
u,L 6= pL
u,L.
15Stage (i) - Price setting of the input producer: Two cases must be distinguished






(L+1)2. We investigate case (a) ￿rst.
Case (a) t>4
ci−cu
(L+1)2 (Technical exclusion of international outsourcing)
Let us ￿rst show that t>4
ci−cu
(L+1)2 is not consistent with international outsourcing in
the free trade equilibrium. Note thereby, that t>4
ci−cu





¢2. Hence, negative pro￿ts are obtained for sales to the ￿nal goods producer
in country s,i fap r i c eps




¢2 <c u is chosen by the input supplier. Since,
a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 1 ) ,DL = L +1− xm
¡
cs,c L¢
is non-decreasing in cs,t h er e s u l t so fs t a g e
(ii) for the outsourcing decision of the two ￿nal goods producers imply that international
outsourcing is not consistent with a pro￿t-maximizing price choice of the input producer,
if t>4
ci−cu
(L+1)2. As a consequence, the ￿nal goods producer of country s produces integrated
under free trade. In this case, we speak of technical exclusion of international outsourcing
(since the transportation technology does not allow for international outsourcing).
If pL
u,L >c i,p r o ￿ts of the input producer are zero. However, if pL
u,L ∈ ]cu,c i],t h e n
























u,L ∈ [ci − γ1,c i]
pL




4 . The input producer faces the following trade-oﬀ by setting the
optimal price. On the one hand, a lower price reduces revenues for a given volume of sales.
But on the other hand, a lower price increases demand for intermediate goods, since it
makes the ￿nal goods producer in country L more competitive and reduces its transport
cost disadvantage for serving consumers located near the common border. (See(21).) In
other words, the ￿nal goods producer of country L can participate in the cost advantage of
fragmentation and outsourcing, if the input producer sets a price lower than ci. According
19Substituting ci = cs and pL





> 0.T h i si su s e d
in (22).
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with ci := cu +
(7L+5)(L+1)
4 and ci := cu +
(17L+19)(L+1)
4 .N o t e t h a t pL∗
u,L depends on ￿nal
goods transport costs and the size of the two economies but it does not depend on para-
meter t since international outsourcing does not occur in equilibrium. It is an immediate
consequence of (23) that pL
u,L <c i −
(5L+7)(L+1)
4 cannot be an optimal price choice. The
reason is that at an input price pL
u,L = ci −
(5L+7)(L+1)
4 the marginal consumer is located
at xm =0 , according to (21), and the whole integrated market (L +1 )is served by the
￿nal goods producer of country L,i . e . DL = L +1 . Thus, a further price reduction
cannot be an optimal strategy for the input producer, since it leaves the volume of sales
unaﬀected. At the other extreme, it may as well be the case that, even for a marginal
price reduction below ci, gains from a higher sales volume cannot oﬀset losses from lower
per unit revenues. Then, setting the component price at its autarky level pL
u,L = ci is the






is the pro￿t-maximizing input price.
In the case of integrated production in both economies, the transport-cost-related
size disadvantage of the large economy implies that the ￿nal goods mill price under free
trade is higher in country L than in country s (i.e. p∗
s,i <p ∗
L,i, according to Proposition 2).
Things are diﬀerent in the case of outsourcing. If trade liberalization leads to a lower input
price pL
u,L,t h e￿nal goods producer in country L can participate in the cost advantage
of fragmentation and outsourcing. This increases its competitiveness and results in a
lower ￿nal goods price p∗
L. (See (20).) Of course, since ￿nal goods prices are strategic
complements, the ￿nal goods producer in the small country will also reduce its price
if pL
u,L (and therefore, according to (20) also p∗
L) declines. However, it is obvious from
a comparison of (19) and (20) that the reduction of p∗
L is more pronounced than the
reduction of p∗
s. This implies that the marginal consumer shifts to the left if pL
u,L declines
17(see (21)).
The possible impact of outsourcing on ￿nal goods prices under free trade is drawn in
￿gure 3, where p∗
L,i (b) and p∗
s,i (b) (with p∗
L,i >p ∗
s,i, according to Proposition 2) refer to the
case of integrated production in both economies, whereas p∗
L (b) and p∗
s (b) refer to the case
of technical exclusion of international outsourcing. Figure 3 accounts for the fact that the
downward shift of the dotted price-location schedule p∗
L,i (b) to p∗
L (b) is more pronounced
than the downward shift of p∗
s,i(b) to p∗
s (b) if the input producer sets pL
u,L <c i. (See the
discussion above.)
>Figure 3<
Substituting ci = cs a n d ,a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 3 ) ,pL∗
u,L = cL in (21) gives the equilibrium
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Whether the marginal consumer is located in the large or in the small economy depends
on the relative strength of two opposing forces (i.e. the following trade-oﬀ of being large),
namely the transport-cost-related size disadvantage and the outsourcing-related produc-
tion cost advantage of country L. The latter is induced by lower marginal production
costs cu <c i.20 If ci−cu >
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 , then it is the outsourcing-related production cost
advantage of the large country that dominates. According to (24), the marginal consumer
i sl o c a t e di nt h es m a l le c o n o m ya n dc o u n t r yL exports the consumption good. This case is
drawn in ￿gure 3. In contrast, if ci−cu <
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 the marginal consumer is located in
L and the small country exports the consumption good. In this case, the transport-cost-
related size disadvantage dominates the outsourcing-related production cost advantage
20As mentioned in Section 2, the notion of ￿cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing￿ refers
to cheaper production under outsourcing than under integrated production. This is a prerequisite for the
￿outsourcing-related production cost advantage of country L￿ (over country s) which arises due to the
existence of a local input producer and the related national outsourcing opportunities in country L.
18of country L. In the borderline case of ci − cu =
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 , the marginal consumer is
located at the common border and there is no trade in the free trade equilibrium. (See
(24).)
Case (b) t ≤ 4
ci−cu
(L+1)2 (International outsourcing from s to L)
If transport costs for input transactions are suﬃciently low, i.e. if t ≤ 4
ci−cu
(L+1)2, the input









. Moreover, note that the whole integrated market (L +1 )i s






¢2 and that, according to (21), lower prices
pk
u,L vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods producer in country k imply, for a given pk0
u,L,l o w e r( n o t











¢2 are not consistent with pro￿t maximization of the input producer. In
view of stage (ii), this implies that the pro￿t-maximizing input price vis-￿-vis the ￿nal
goods producer in country s is given by ps∗




¢2, leading to ps,d
u = ci.P r o ￿ts






























u,L ∈ [ci − γ1,c i]
pL





4 .U s i n gps∗




¢2 in the pro￿t-maximization problem of
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Thus, by maximizing pro￿ts, the input producer decides for price discrimination and sets
pL∗
u,L >p s∗
u,L (as long as t>0).
While transport costs for input transactions are zero in the case of national out-





21Substituting ci = ps,d
u = cs and pL











> 0.T h i si su s e di n( 2 5 ) .
19shipping one unit of the input from the upstream producer located at the center of coun-
try L to the downstream producer located at the center of country s.H e n c e , t h e r e i s
again an outsourcing-related production cost advantage of country L over country s.22
Moreover, the ￿nal goods producer in country s cannot participate in the cost advantage
of fragmentation and outsourcing (over integrated production), given the optimal price
choice ps∗




¢2, which implies ps,d
u = ci.23 Things are diﬀerent in the large
economy, where the ￿nal goods producer can participate in the cost advantage of frag-
mentation and outsourcing if the input producer sets pL
u,L <c i. The optimal price choice
pL∗
u,L itself depends on transport costs for input transactions and therefore on parameter
t.T h el o w e rp a r a m e t e rt, the higher is pL∗
u,L, according to (26). If t is high enough, there
are pro￿ts to gain from setting pL
u,L <c i. However, if t is low, setting pL
u,L <c i reduces
pro￿ts. This is, since losses for a given sales volume dominate gains arising from higher
sales to the local ￿nal goods producer. Note thereby, that these additional sales are at
costs of lower exports to country s (for which the input producer gains positive pro￿ts if
t<4
ci−cu
(L+1)2 and sales of the ￿nal goods producer in country s are positive).24
Substituting ci = ps,d
u = cs a n d ,a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 6 ) ,pL∗
u,L = cL in (21) gives the equilib-
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The location of the marginal consumer again, depends on two opposing eﬀects, namely
the transport-cost-related size disadvantage and the outsourcing-related production cost
advantage of country L. Taking into account this trade-oﬀ, gives the following result.
If transport costs are suﬃciently high, i.e. if t>17L−5
L+1 (and t ≤ 4
ci−cu
(L+1)2), the input
22Final goods production costs include all costs that are necessary to manufacture ￿nal output. Hence,
they also include transport costs for intermediate goods transactions in the case of international out-
sourcing.
23For the diﬀerence in the use of the two notions ￿outsourcing-related production cost advantage of
country L￿ and ￿cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing￿ see footnote 20.
24Due to 7L+5
L+1 > 1 it follows from (26) that pL∗
u,L = ci for all t ≤ 1. Hence, pL∗
u,L <c i requires that
transportation of intermediate goods induces higher costs than transportation of ￿nal output.
20producer sets price pL
u,L low enough, such that the marginal consumer is located in country
s and country L exports the consumption good. In this case, the outsourcing-related
production cost advantage (in the form of access to intermediate goods without transport
costs) dominates the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy. The
opposite holds true if t<17L−5
L+1 . In this case, the marginal consumer is located in country
L and country s exports the consumption good. In the borderline case of t = 17L−5
L+1 ,
the marginal consumer is located at the common border and trade of ￿nal goods does
not occur. However, there are intermediate goods exports of the large economy, i.e.
international outsourcing of the ￿nal goods producer in country s.
The main ￿ndings for the two diﬀe r e n tc a s e s( a )a n d( b )o fS u b s e c t i o n4 . 2a r es u m -
m a r i z e di nP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 2, if there is a single input producer located in coun-
try L, then: In the free trade equilibrium there is international outsourcing of the ￿nal
g o o d sp r o d u c e ri nc o u n t r ys, if transport costs for intermediate inputs are not too high,
i.e. if t ≤ 4
ci−cu
(L+1)2. In contrast, t>4
ci−cu
(L+1)2 implies technical exclusion of international
outsourcing and integrated production in country s. In both cases, country L exports
the consumption good, if the outsourcing-related production cost advantage dominates the
transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy. Otherwise, country s exports
the consumption good.
Proof. Proposition 3 follows from the analysis above.
4.3 Specialized Input Production in Both Economies
In this subsection, it is assumed that two input producers are active under free trade: one
located at the center of country s and one located at the center of country L. Hence, the
location of the input producer in country s is given by xu =1 /2 and the location of the
input producer in country L is given by xu =1+L/2.
Stage (ii) - Outsourcing decision: The ￿nal goods producer in country k decides









, k 6= k0 ∈ {s,L}.M o r e o v e r , t h e r e i s






¢2 and there is international

















Stage (i) - Price setting of the two input producers: Similar to stage (iii),
we impose a restriction on the price-setting behavior and assume pk
u,k ≥ cu, k = s,L.
This restriction guarantees uniqueness of the price equilibrium. (See the discussion in
footnote 16.) Price competition between the two intermediate input producers leads to a










k = s,L. The following lemma holds.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 2, if there is a single input producer in either economy,
then there is national but not international outsourcing in the free trade equilibrium.











In this case, we speak of competitive exclusion of international outsourcing. Imitation
of the price choice of the input producer in the partner country guarantees a positive
amount of input sales at home, implying 0 <x m <L+1 . (See (21).) Hence, pro￿ts of















































, there are two restrictions on pk
u,k. Focussing




¢2 implies that pk







u,s = cs and pL











3(L+1) > 0, according to the considerations above. This is used in (28) and (29).




can be derived in an analogous way.
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according to (28) and (29). Substituting ps∗
u,s = cs and pL∗
u,L = cL in (21) gives the location
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, implying that the marginal
consumer is resident of the large economy. Hence, country s exports ￿nal output. This
is similar to the case of integrated production in both economies and, again, driven by
the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large country. However, the hinterland
eﬀect is even stronger in the case of national outsourcing in both economies. If production
is integrated, due to its larger hinterland, the ￿nal goods producer in country L decides for
a￿ less aggressive￿ price strategy than its counterpart in s. (This follows from the analysis
in Subsection 4.1.) In the case of competitive exclusion of international outsourcing the
larger hinterland of country L implies that both the down-stream and the up-stream
producer in L have an incentive to decide for a higher price than their counterparts in s.
This explains, why in equilibrium both the input price and the ￿nal goods mill price are





s, according to (19) and (20). The main ￿ndings of Subsection 4.3 are summarized
in Proposition 4.27
27If there were a second input producer located at the center of the large economy, then price compe-
tition among component producers would drive down input prices in country L to the level of marginal
23Proposition 4 Under Assumption 2, if there is input production in both economies, then:
There is competitive exclusion of international outsourcing and both ￿nal goods producers
make use of national outsourcing opportunities in the free trade equilibrium. Due to a
larger hinterland, the input producer in the large country has an incentive to set a higher
(not lower) price than the input producer in the small economy. This implies that the
transport-cost-related size disadvantage of the large economy is (potentially) reinforced and
that the small country exports the consumption good. An outsourcing-related production
cost advantage of the large country does not arise.
Proof. Proposition 4 follows from the analysis above.
5W e l f a r e E ﬀects of Trade Liberalization
In Section 4 we have investigated how trade liberalization aﬀects the price-setting be-
havior of input and ￿nal goods producers and have shed some light on the trade pattern
between two asymmetrically sized economies. The results of this analysis are used to
determine the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization.28 The two cases integrated production
in both economies and competitive exclusion of international outsourcing are similar in
two respects. First, trade liberalization does not aﬀect the mode of ￿nal goods production
and, second, the same production modes are used in the two economies. Due to the latter,
there is no outsourcing-related production cost advantage of country L and country s ex-
ports the consumption good in the free trade equilibrium, given the transport-cost-related
size disadvantage of the (geographically) large economy. Things are diﬀerent in the case
of a single input producer in country L. If transport costs for intermediate goods are high
so that international outsourcing is technically excluded, again, trade liberalization has
no eﬀect on the production modes in the two economies. While the ￿nal goods producer
production costs cu. In this case, the large country would have a ￿competitive￿ advantage over the
small economy, resulting in lower variable production costs in the down-stream process of ￿nal goods
production, i.e. pL
u,L = cu <p s
u,s. Such a competition eﬀect is not considered in this paper.
28The discussion in this section is under the caveat that only welfare eﬀects in a partial equilibrium
framework are considered.
24in the large country makes use of outsourcing opportunities, its counterpart in the small
country uses the (inferior) integrated production technique. This gives the large economy
an outsourcing-related production cost advantage over the small country. In contrast, if
transport costs for intermediate input transactions are low, it pays for the input supplier
to set a price vis-￿-vis the ￿nal goods producer in the small economy that makes interna-
tional outsourcing an attractive choice for this producer. In this case, trade liberalization
leads to a switch in the small economy from integrated to fragmented production, so that
both ￿nal goods producers outsource component production under free trade. There is
again an outsourcing-related production cost advantage of the large economy, since under
national outsourcing transport costs for input transactions are zero. The main ￿nding
of Subsection 4.2 is that the outsourcing-related production cost advantage of country L
may be large enough to outweigh its transport-cost-related size disadvantage so that the
large economy exports the consumption good in the free trade equilibrium.
In the following analysis, we investigate in which way trade patterns and outsourcing
opportunities are related to the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. As a welfare measure
the sum of consumer and producer surplus is used.
As a ￿rst result, the ￿nal goods exporting country always gains from trade liberal-
ization. The pro-competitive eﬀect of falling tariﬀs leads to a price reduction in both
economies and, therefore, to lower pro￿ts from local sales. However, in the ￿nal goods
exporting country these pro￿t losses are fully compensated by consumer surplus gains. In
addition to this welfare-neutral redistribution eﬀect, there are pro￿tg a i n sf r o m￿nal goods
exports, leading to a positive welfare eﬀect in the ￿nal goods exporting country. This out-
come is independent of the respective production modes used in the two economies. There
may be additional welfare gains for the large economy from intermediate goods exports
(in the case of international outsourcing), which will be considered below.
We start with a detailed investigation of the possible welfare eﬀects that trade liber-
alization may have if production is integrated in both economies. Thereafter, it is brie￿y
argued why the identi￿ed welfare eﬀects are qualitatively equivalent to the welfare eﬀects
that arise if there is (specialzed) input production in both economies (leading to com-
25petitive exclusion of international outsourcing). In a ￿nal step, we show how the welfare
eﬀects change if the large country has an outsourcing-related production cost advantage
over the small economy.
Integrated production in both economies
If no specialized input producer is active, production in both economies is integrated and
the marginal consumer is located at address xm = 5L+7
12 > 1. Hence, country s exports
the consumption good in the free trade equilibrium. The export-related pro￿tg a i n sl e a d








db > 0 in the small economy. This
corresponds to the general observation that trade liberalization is always bene￿cial for
the ￿nal goods exporting country.
Things are more complicated in the large economy. The ￿nal goods producer of





.A n y p r o ￿t
losses for sales to these consumers that are induced by the pro-competitive eﬀect of trade
liberalization are compensated by consumer surplus gains and leave country L￿s welfare






are substituted by imports from country s.O p p o s i n gw e l f a r ee ﬀects arise





buy ￿nal goods at
lower prices under free trade (as compared to the autarky situation). To determine which
eﬀect dominates requires a formal investigation.




























∆CSL > 0 and ∆PSL < 0 are consumer and producer surplus changes (of country





. According to Propositions 1 and
2, pa
L = A − L2/4 and p∗
s,i = ci +
(5L+7)(L+1)
12 . Accounting for transport costs, gives
pa
L (b)=pa
L +[ b − (1 + L/2)]
2 and p∗
s,i(b)=p∗
s,i +[ b − 1/2]
2. Thus, welfare changes in






[b − (1 + L/2)]






where ∆T = 5
288 (L +1 )( L − 1)
2 represents the transport cost disadvantage of country
L for serving consumers located close to the common border. After straightforward cal-
culations, it can be shown that consumer surplus gains are dominated by pro￿tl o s s e s
so that trade liberalization induces a welfare decline in country L which is given by
∆WL = − 5
96 (3L3 +5 L2 − 3L − 5) < 0. Finally, overall world welfare changes are posi-






∆W := ∆Ws + ∆WL = ∆T>0.
>Figure 4<






.P r o ￿t gains of the ￿nal goods producer in the small economy are
given by area ABCD and pro￿tl o s s e so ft h e￿nal goods producer in country L correspond
to area AEFD.( A r e a sABCD and AEFD are pro￿tg a i n sa n dp r o ￿ts losses, respectively,











. According to the analysis above, trade liberalization leads to a
welfare decline in the importing country L, i.e. GHIJ −AEFD < 0 in ￿gure 4, whereas
overall world welfare increases due to a reduction of total transport cost expenditures,
which is represented by the diﬀerence of the two areas EHIF−BGJC = ∆T = ∆W>0.
Competitive exclusion of international outsourcing
If there is (specialized) input production in both economies, price competition between the
two component producers implies that there is national but not international outsourcing
in the free trade equilibrium.29 Hence, there is no outsourcing-related production cost
29In both economies there is national outsourcing under autarky and under free trade so that trade
liberalization does not aﬀe c tt h em o d eo f￿nal goods production.
27advantage of the large economy. As a result, the large country imports the ￿nal good
(and the small country exports it). Welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization are qualitatively
equivalent to those identi￿ed for the case of integrated production in both economies.
Welfare in the small country rises and welfare in the large country declines. Overall world
welfare is positively aﬀected by trade liberalization due to a decline in total transport cost
expenditures. For a formal proof of these results see Appendix B.
Specialized input production in the large economy
If only in country L there is specialized input production, two cases have to be distin-
guished. First, technical exclusion of international outsourcing arises if transport costs for
intermediate goods transactions are prohibitive, i.e. if t>4
ci−cu
(L+1)2. Second, if transport
costs for intermediate goods transactions are suﬃciently low, i.e. if t ≤ 4
ci−cu
(L+1)2,t h e r ei s
international outsourcing from country s to country L in the free trade equilibrium. The
main diﬀerence to integrated production in both economies and competitive exclusion of
international outsourcing is that an outsourcing-related production cost advantage of the
large economy may oﬀset its transport-cost-related size disadvantage, if only in country
L there is specialized input production. Hence, the large economy may export the con-
sumption good and, therefore, bene￿t from trade liberalization. A detailed analysis of
further diﬀerences is presented below.30
Technical exclusion of international outsourcing
If t>4
ci−cu
(L+1)2, only the ￿nal goods producer in country L outsources component pro-
duction under free trade, whereas the ￿nal goods producer in the small economy em-
ploys the integrated production mode. Three subcases can be distinguished. First, if
ci −cu <
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 , the outsourcing-related production cost advantage is too small and
the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of country L dominates. As a consequence,
country s exports the consumption good and bene￿ts from trade liberalization, i.e. wel-
fare in country s increases. Welfare in country L declines, since pro￿t losses dominate
30For a formal proof of the results see Appendix B.
28consumer surplus gains. The impact of trade liberalization on world welfare is ambiguous.
On the one hand, there is a reduction in overall transport cost expenditures which tends
to increase world welfare. But on the other hand, local sales in the large economy that
are produced under fragmentation and outsourcing are partially replaced by imports from
the small economy, where production is integrated. This implies a (partial) switch to an
inferior production mode and induces a negative welfare eﬀect that may dominate the
bene￿ts resulting from a reduction in transport cost expenditures. In sum, the impact of
trade liberalization on overall world welfare depends on two opposing eﬀects and turns
out to be ambiguous. Second, if ci − cu =
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 , there is no trade of ￿nal goods
since the marginal consumer is located at the common border of the two economies. In
this case, the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of country L is exactly oﬀset by
its outsourcing-related production cost advantage. Since there is no ￿nal goods trade,
welfare is not aﬀected by trade liberalization. Third, if ci − cu >
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 ,t h e ni ti s
the outsourcing-related production cost advantage that dominates. Country L exports
the consumption good and bene￿ts from trade liberalization. Welfare eﬀects in the small
economy are ambiguous. There are pro￿t losses and consumer surplus gains. Which of
the two eﬀects dominates is not clear. Intuitively, if the (per unit) cost advantage of
outsourcing and fragmentation (given by ci − cu)i ss u ﬃciently large, the input producer
has an incentive to set pL
u,L low enough such that consumer surplus gains in country s
dominate pro￿t losses and the small economy bene￿ts even if it imports the consump-
tion good. Finally, overall world welfare rises under trade liberalization. The reason is
that the input producer considers both the transport cost expenditures for ￿nal goods
transactions and the cost advantage of outsourcing and fragmentation when setting pL
u,L.
Thus, given the pro￿t-maximizing price-setting behavior of ￿rms, overall world welfare
unambiguously increases if country L exports the consumption good.
International outsourcing from country s to country L
If t ≤ 4
ci−cu
(L+1)





¢2, so that international outsourc-
ing is attractive for the ￿nal goods producer in the small economy. Again, three subcases
29can be distinguished. First, if t<17L−5
L+1 , the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of
country L dominates its outsourcing-related production cost advantage. Thus, country s
bene￿ts from trade liberalization since it exports the ￿nal good. Welfare changes in coun-
try L are ambiguous. Besides the eﬀects analyzed above, trade liberalization also leads
to pro￿t gains from intermediate goods exports to country s,i ft h e￿nal goods producer
in the small country outsources component production to the input producer located in
the large economy.31 If these pro￿t gains are high enough, the large country may bene￿t
from trade liberalization, even if it imports the consumption good. Overall world welfare
eﬀects are also ambiguous, since substitution of local production in the large economy by
imports from country s induces additional transport cost expenditures for intermediate
goods transactions and thus, a negative welfare eﬀect that may dominate transport cost
savings for ￿nal goods transactions and any pro￿t gains related to intermediate goods
exports. Second, if t = 17L−5
L+1 ,t h e r ei sn o￿nal goods trade in the free trade equilibrium
(i.e. xm =1 ). Given the optimal price-setting behavior of the input supplier, the ￿nal
goods producer in country s cannot participate in the cost advantage of fragmentation and
outsourcing. Hence, welfare in country s is unaﬀected by trade liberalization. However,
if t<4
ci−cu
(L+1)2 welfare in country L and overall world welfare increase due to intermediate
goods exports of country L. (In the benchmark case of t =4
ci−cu
(L+1)2 welfare in country L
and world welfare are not aﬀected by trade liberalization.) Third, in the case of t>17L−5
L+1
country L gains from trade liberalization since it exports the ￿nal good. In analogy to
the case of technical exclusion of international outsourcing, welfare eﬀects in country s
are ambiguous, whereas overall world welfare increases.
T a b l e1s u m m a r i z e st h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of trade liberalization if only in country L there
is a specialized input producer. The existence of international outsourcing depends on
three factors: (a) the cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing ci − cu,( b )t h e
transport cost parameter t and (c) the distance between the location of the ￿nal goods
producer in country s and the location of the input producer in country L, i.e. L+1
2 .
31Pro￿t gains from intermediate goods exports are positive, if t<4 ci−cu
(L+1)2, and they are zero, if
t =4ci−cu
(L+1)2.
30The higher the cost advantage ci − cu and the lower parameter t and distance L+1
2 (i.e.
the lower L), the more likely is international outsourcing in the free trade equilibrium.
For the pattern of ￿nal goods trade also relative country size L − 1 (or more precisely
17L−5) turns out to be important (see table 1). According to the considerations above,
international outsourcing prevails in equilibrium and country L exports ￿nal output if
the cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing (ci − cu)i sh i g ha n dt h ed i ﬀerence
in country sizes (L − 1) is not too large. A higher degree of market integration at the
intermediate goods level, i.e. a lower t,m a k e s￿nal goods exports of country L less likely.
Things are diﬀerent if the cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing (ci − cu)
is moderate and transport costs for input transactions (depending on parameter t and
distance L+1
2 ) are high. In this case international outsourcing is technologically excluded.
Again, country L exports ￿nal output if it is not too large (and therefore its transport-
cost-related size disadvantage not too high). The larger country L (relative to country s),
the more likely it is that country s exports the ￿nal good.
TABLE 1. Welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization if only in country L there is interme-
diate input production
Final goods ex- Welfare eﬀects Welfare eﬀects World welfare
porting country in country s in country L eﬀects
Technical exclusion of international outsourcing, i.e. t>4 ci−cu
(L+1)2
(i) ci − cu <
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 country s + − amb.
(ii) ci − cu =
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 no ￿nal goods trade 0 0 0
(iii) ci − cu >
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 country L amb. + +
International outsourcing from s to L,i . e .t ≤ 4 ci−cu
(L+1)2
(i) t<17L−5
L+1 country s + amb. amb.
(ii) t = 17L−5
L+1 no ￿nal goods trade 0 +/0 +/0
(iii) t>17L−5
L+1 country L amb. + +
Notes:I nt h i sm a t r i x￿ +￿, ￿−￿a n d￿ 0￿ mean that trade liberalization has a positive, negative or no
eﬀect on the respective welfare levels. A ￿amb.￿ indicates that the impact is ambiguous.
316 Discussion
Section 5 has analyzed the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization for diﬀerent scenarios
regarding the existence of specialized input production in the two economies. It is an
immediate consequence of Assumption 2 and the induced pro-competitive eﬀect of trade
liberalization on ￿nal goods prices that consumers in both economies bene￿t from a tariﬀ
reduction.32 Moreover, it is clear that welfare (measured by the sum of consumer and
producer surplus) in the ￿nal goods exporting country always increases. Which of the
two economies exports the ￿nal good depends on the existence of specialized input pro-
duction in the two countries and the respective parameter values. In Section 4 it has been
shown that the outsourcing-related production cost advantage of a large, population rich
economy may outweigh its transport-cost-related size disadvantage so that it becomes
the ￿nal goods exporter and, therefore, bene￿ts from trade liberalization. However, un-
der outsourcing it is not only relevant which of the two economies exports/imports the
￿nal good to determine the winner and the loser of trade liberalization. If there is an
outsourcing-related production cost advantage of the large economy, then both countries
may gain from tariﬀ reductions. On the one hand, if pL
u,L is chosen low enough (and
country L exports ￿nal output), consumer surplus gains may dominate pro￿tl o s s e si n
the small economy. Hence, welfare in country s may increase, even if it imports the con-
sumption good. On the other hand, in the case of international outsourcing the large
economy bene￿ts from intermediate goods exports so that welfare in the large country
may increase, even if it imports the consumption good.
That the small and the large country can simultaneously bene￿t from declining trade
barriers is an important result, since it makes in both countries trade liberalization an
attractive policy choice without the necessity of cross-country redistribution measures.
The existence of gains from trade in all (involved) economies is a result that is well-
known from the traditional trade literature. However, the positive eﬀects of free trade
are less clear in models of the new trade theory with imperfect competition in goods
32This is a mere price eﬀect, since Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee full coverage under autarky and free
trade.
32markets. Wong (1995) gives an excellent overview on the gains from trade for economies
under imperfections. As far as spatial models are concerned, Tharakan and Thisse (2002)
investigate the impact of the geographical size of countries on the distribution of welfare
gains. They come up with the result that ￿large countries, unlike small ones, should be
less inclined towards free trade￿ (p. 399), since their welfare decreases in response to trade
liberalization. Tharakan and Thisse (2002) do not account for outsourcing opportunities,
so that welfare eﬀects are determined by the transport-cost-related size disadvantage of
the large economy. (Compare the welfare eﬀects under integrated production in both
economies derived in Section 5.)33
The analysis in this paper also points to the possibility that trade liberalization leads
to a decline in overall world welfare, if exports of the small economy (partially) substitute
local sales in the large country which are manufactured under a superior production mode
and/or without any transport costs for intermediate goods transactions. Thus, trade
liberalization is not always bene￿cial but may exert immiserizing world welfare eﬀects.34
The international outsourcing case analyzed above seems to be well in line with a cou-
ple of stylized facts, when considering 1995 data of the EU15 countries.35 First, domestic
outsourcing of these countries is positively associated with population size. The correla-
tion coeﬃcient amounts to 0.54 (signi￿cant at 5%). Second, the measure of international
outsourcing is negatively correlated with population size as re￿ected by a coeﬃcient of
−0.61, again signi￿cant at 5%.36 Finally, a ￿nal goods trade surplus is (insigni￿cantly)
33Tharakan (2001) shows in a Hotelling model that both the geographical sizes and the population
densities of countries are important determinants of the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization.
34I.e., overall producer surplus losses may dominate overall consumer surplus gains.
35We use data on purchases of domestic intermediate goods and services in percent of gross production
from EUROSTAT (Input-Output Tables) as a measure of national outsourcing and data on intermediate
goods imports from UNO (Broad Economic Categories) in percent of GDP from the World Bank (World
Development Indicators) as a measure of international outsourcing. Similarly, the countries￿ ￿nal goods
trade balances are taken from UNO and expressed in percent of GDP. Data on geographic area and
population sizes stem from the World Bank (World Development Indicators).
36The corresponding rank correlation coeﬃcients have also been considered to control for the potential
in￿uence of outliers. In any case, the rank correlation coeﬃcients are very close to the correlation
coeﬃcients and they are similarly signi￿cant.
33associated with both higher population and area size.37
Using these empirical ￿ndings together with the theoretical results of Section 5 leads to
the following prediction regarding the welfare eﬀects of the European integration process.
Since in the sample of EU15 economies international outsourcing is negatively correlated
with population size and since larger countries are more likely to be net exporters of
￿nal output, trade liberalization should have increased their welfare. Regarding welfare
eﬀects in the small, ￿nal goods (net) importing economies, there is no clear prediction
of the model, according to the analysis in Section 5. However, if consumers in small
countries can suﬃciently participate in the outsourcing-related production cost advantage
of large economies, both large and small member countries should have bene￿ted from
falling tariﬀs in Europe. These results point to the crucial role of outsourcing for making
European integration a successful story with all the EU member countries gaining from
trade liberalization.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has dealt with the interaction of ￿nal goods trade and outsourcing in a spatial
model ￿ la Hotelling. In this framework the impact of trade liberalization between two
asymmetrically sized economies on the ￿nal goods trade pattern and welfare has been
analyzed. It has been shown that the large country can only export the ￿nal good if it
has an outsourcing-related production cost advantage over the small economy. Otherwise
the small country exports the ￿nal good. The ￿nal goods trade pattern is important
for the welfare eﬀects of trade liberalization. The country which exports ￿nal output
always bene￿ts from trade liberalization, whereas the ￿nal goods importing country may
lose. Under integrated production in both economies or if both countries oﬀer the same
(national) outsourcing opportunities (resulting in competitive exclusion of international
outsourcing), the large country imports ￿nal output and its welfare declines in response to
at a r i ﬀ reduction. In contrast, if specialized input production only takes place in the large
37This result is obtained from a Kruskal-Wallis χ2-test (with p-values of 0.38 and of 0.61, respectively).
34economy, both countries may bene￿t from trade liberalization. This is either the case if
the small country imports the ￿nal good and its consumers can suﬃciently participate
in the cost advantage of fragmentation and outsourcing, or if the large country imports
the ￿nal good and exports the intermediate good to the small economy. However, the
analysis in this paper also points to the possibility that trade liberalization leads to an
overall world welfare decline. Such an outcome may arise if only in the large country there
is (specialized) input production and the small country exports ￿nal output.
Appendix
A p p e n d i xA :P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Consider A>c i + 15L2+12L
12 , according to Assumption 2, and use cs ≤ ci, cL ≤ ci.T h e
proof is organized in two steps:
Step (i): Price setting and interior solutions
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35respectively. (Using φ
j
s instead of πs eases the proof.) The ￿rst derivatives of (36)-(38)


















































Evaluating (39)-(41) at autarky prices pa
s = A − 1/4, pa
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It is straightforward to show that, for any cs ≤ ci, A>c i + 15L2+12L






















∂ps∂pL ≥ 0 and the fact that πs is
a continuous function in ps (see (35)), it follows that pL ≤ pa
L and Ds > 0 are only
consistent with a free trade equilibrium if ps <p a
s. (Existence of such an equilibrium will
be discussed below.)
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Evaluating (39)-(41) at autarky prices pa
s = A − 1/4, pa
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It is straightforward to show that, for any cL ≤ ci, A>c i + 15L2+12L






















∂pL∂ps ≥ 0 and the fact that πL is
a continuous function in pL (see (45)), it follows that ps ≤ pa
s and DL > 0 are only
consistent with a free trade equilibrium if pL <p a
L.
Finally, note that ps >p a
s and pL >p a
L cannot simultaneously hold in the free trade
equilibrium if pa
s and pa
L are pro￿t-maximizing prices under autarky. Then, an interior
solution with Ds > 0 and DL > 0 is only consistent with pro￿t maximization of the two
￿nal goods producers if pL <p a
L and ps <p a
s simultaneously hold in equilibrium. This
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(These prices are obtained by setting (39) and (49) equal to zero. Second-order conditions








L < 0.) Using (55) and (56) in (10)-
38ps <p a
s = A − 1/4 and pL <p a
L = A − L2/4 can be shown by using cs ≤ ci and cL ≤ ci together
with A>c i + 15L2+12L
12 .
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Step (ii): Price setting and corner solutions:
There are two candidates for corner solutions, namely Ds =0and DL =0 .I f cL ≤
cs−
(5L+7)(L+1)
4 then, according to (57), an interior solution with Ds > 0 is not compatible
with pro￿t maximization of the two ￿nal goods producers. In this case, equilibrium prices
ful￿ll39 pL = ps −
(L+3)(L+1)
4 and ps ≤ cs so that xm =0 , according to (10), and therefore
DL = L +1 , Ds =0 . In contrast, if cL ≥ cs +
(7L+5)(L+1)
4 then, according to (58), an
interior solution with DL > 0 is not compatible with pro￿t maximization of the two ￿nal
goods producers. In this case, equilibrium prices ful￿ll ps = pL −
(3L+1)(L+1)
4 and pL ≤ cL
so that xm = L +1 , according to (10), and therefore Ds = xm = L +1 , DL =0 .
According to steps (i) and (ii) the following holds in the free trade equilibrium: De-
mand for ￿nal output produced in the two countries is given by Ds = xm and DL =
L +1− xm, respectively, so that Ds + DL = L +1 . Together with (15) and (16) this
implies πs =( ps − cs)xm (ps,p L) and πL =
¡
pL − cL¢
(L +1− xm (ps,p L)) and, therefore,
establishes Lemma 1. ¥
Appendix B: Formal Derivation of the Welfare Eﬀects of Trade
Liberalization
Assumption 2 is considered throughout Appendix B.
39Although the ￿nal goods producer in country s is indiﬀerent between all ps ≥ cs if Ds =0 , prices
ps >c s are not consistent with an equilibrium. Moreover, the price equilibrium is not unique if cL <
cs −
(5L+7)(L+1)
4 . In this case, not only ps = cs but also some ps <c s are consistent with an equilibrium.
38The case of competitive exclusion of international outsourcing
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   




































[b − (1 + L/2)]






(5L +7 )( L +1 )
12




      







































m, according to (32), and substituting (63) in (62) gives
∆WL =

   











































[b − (1 + L/2)]





   































39and, therefore, ∆W>0.40 This completes the proof. ¥
The case of technical exclusion of international outsourcing (i.e. t>4
ci−cu
(L+1)2)
The proof is organized in three parts.
Part (i): Consider ci − cu <
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 .T h e n ,x∗
m > 1 follows, according to (24). The
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Since ci − cu <
(L−1)(L+1)
24 implies ci <c i, it is straightforward to show that ∆W R 0 if
ci − cu Q
(L−1)(L+1)
24 .
Part (ii): If ci − cu =
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 , then the marginal consumer is located at x∗
m =1 ,
according to (24), so that welfare in both economies and, therefore, also overall world
welfare are unaﬀected by free trade, i.e. ∆W = ∆Wk =0 , k = s,L.
Part (iii): Consider ci − cu >
(17L−5)(L+1)
4 . Then, x∗
m < 1 holds, according to (24), so
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2. pa
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From (76) it is obvious that ∆Ws R 0 if ci−cu R
(17L+11)(L+1)
4 .( R e m e m b e rt h a tci−cu >
(17L−5)(L+1)
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, (77)
with ∆W>0. This completes the proof. ¥
The case of international outsourcing (i.e. t ≤ 4
ci−cu
(L+1)2)
The proof is organized in three parts.
Part (i): Consider t<17L−5
L+1 . Then, x∗
m > 1 h o l d s ,a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 7 ) ,s ot h a tt r a d e
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Since t ≤ 4
ci−cu
(L+1)2, it is straightforward to show that the sign of ∆WL is ambiguous. Using
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From (83) it is obvious that the sign of ∆W is ambiguous. However, t< L−1
6(L+1) is suﬃcient
for ∆W>0.41 Thereby, L−1
6(L+1) < 7L+5
L+1 has been considered.
Part (ii): Note that, according to (27), there is no trade of the consumption good
if t = 17L−5






¢2 = ci implies that welfare in country s is not
aﬀected by trade liberalization. Due to exports of the intermediate good, welfare changes







db, which are strictly positive if t<4
ci−cu
(L+1)2.
In contrast, welfare in L is unchanged, if t =4
ci−cu
(L+1)2. Overall world welfare changes are
determined by welfare changes in L, i.e. ∆W = ∆WL,s i n c e∆Ws =0 .
Part (iii): Consider t>17L−5
L+1 .T h e n ,x∗
m < 1 holds, according to (27), so that trade lib-
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ate goods exports to country s.U s e ps,d
u = ci . Then, welfare changes in country s are
41Moreover, t> L−1
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Thus, ∆Ws R 0 if t R 17L+11
L+1 .( R e m e m b e rt h a tt>17L−5
L+1 holds.) Finally, using ∆W =
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proof. ¥
44References
Amiti, Mary (1998), Inter-Industry Trade in Manufactures: Does Country Size Matter?,
Journal of International Economics 44, 231-255.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004),
Arndt, Sven W. (1997), Globalization and the Open Economy, North American Journal
of Economics and Finance 8, 71-79.
Baier, Scott L. and Jeﬀrey H. Bergstrand (2000), The Growth of World Trade and Out-
sourcing, unpublished manuscript presented at the American Economic Association
meeting January 2001.
Burda, Michael C. and Barbara Dluhosch (2002), Cost Competition, Fragmentation and
Globalization, Review of International Economics 10, 424-41.
Cabrales, Antonio and Massimo Motta (2001), Country Asymmetries, Endogenous Prod-
uct Choice and the Timing of Trade Liberalization, European Economic Review 45,
87-107.
Coase, (1937)
d￿Aspremont, Claude, Jean J. Gabszewicz, and Jacques-Fran￿ois Thisse (1979), On
Hotelling￿s ￿Stability in Competition￿, Econometrica 47, 1145-1150.
Deardorﬀ, Alan V. (2001), International Provision of Trade Services, Trade, and Frag-
mentation, Review of International Economics 9, 233-248.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter Egger (2003), Outsourcing and Skill-Speci￿cE m p l o y m e n t
in a Small Economy: Austria after the Fall of the Iron Curtain, Oxford Economic
Papers,f o r t h c o m i n g .
Egger, Hartmut and Josef Falkinger (2003), Policy when Firm Location Matters: A
Macroeconomic Model with Imperfect Competition and International Outsourcing,
CESifo Working Paper ???.
45Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson (1996), Globalization, Outsourcing and
Wage Inequality, American Economic Review 86, 240-245.
Feenstra Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson (1999), The Impact of Outsourcing and
High-Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates for the United States, 1979-1990,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 907-940.
Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson (2001), Global Production Sharing and
Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages, in Kwan Choi and James Harrigan
(eds.), Handbook of International Trade, Basil Blackwell, forthcoming.
Grossman Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (2002a), Integration versus Outsourcing in
Industry Equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 85-120.
Grossman Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (2002b), Outsourcing in a Global Economy,
NBER Wroking Paper 8728.
H u m m e l s ,D a v i d ,J u nI s h i i ,a n dK e i - M uY i( 2 0 0 1 ) ,T h eN a t u r ea n dG r o w t ho fV e r t i c a l
Specialization in World Trade, Journal of International Economics 54, 75-96.
Jones, Ronald W. (2000) Globalization and the Theory of Input Trade,M I TP r e s s ,C a m -
bridge.
Jones, Ronald W. and Henryk Kierzkowski (2001), A Framework for Fragmentaton,
in Sven W. Arndt and Henryk Kierzkowski, eds., Fragmentation: New Production
Patterns in the World Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 17-34.
Kohler, Wilhelm (2003), The Distributional Eﬀects of International Outsourcing, Ger-
man Economic Review 40, 89-120.
Krugman, Paul R. (1980), Scale Economies, Product Diﬀerentiation, and the Pattern of
Trade, American Economic Review 70, 950-959.
Kumar et al. (2001),
46Ludema, Rodney D. and Ian Wooton (2000), Economic geography and the ￿scal eﬀects
of regional integration, Journal of International Economics 52, 331-357.
Markusen, James R. (1981), Trade and the Gains from Trade with Imperfect Competi-
tion, Journal of International Economics 11, 531-551.
Shachmurove, Yochanan and Uriel Spiegel (1995), On Nations￿ Size and Transportation
Costs, Review of International Economics 3, 235-243.
Tharakan, Joe (2001), Revisiting ￿On Nations Size￿ and Transportation Costs￿, CORE
Discussion Paper 2001/32.
Tharakan, Joe and Jacques-Fran￿ois Thisse (2002), The Importance of Being Small. Or



















Price  Price 
1 s =
1/4 A−
2 /4 AL −
1/2 1 /2 L +
() a
s pb () a
L pb






Figure 1. Autarky equilibrium in two asymmetrically sized economies 
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Figure 3. Free final goods trade with and without outsourcing in country L 
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Figure 4. Welfare changes under integrated production in both economies 